"""Security watchdog for enforcing URL access policies.""" from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, ClassVar from bubus import BaseEvent from browser_use.browser.events import ( BrowserErrorEvent, NavigateToUrlEvent, NavigationCompleteEvent, TabCreatedEvent, ) from browser_use.browser.watchdog_base import BaseWatchdog if TYPE_CHECKING: pass # Track if we've shown the glob warning _GLOB_WARNING_SHOWN = False class SecurityWatchdog(BaseWatchdog): """Monitors and enforces security policies for URL access.""" # Event contracts LISTENS_TO: ClassVar[list[type[BaseEvent]]] = [ NavigateToUrlEvent, NavigationCompleteEvent, TabCreatedEvent, ] EMITS: ClassVar[list[type[BaseEvent]]] = [ BrowserErrorEvent, ] async def on_NavigateToUrlEvent(self, event: NavigateToUrlEvent) -> None: """Check if navigation URL is allowed before navigation starts.""" # Security check BEFORE navigation if not self._is_url_allowed(event.url): self.logger.warning(f'⛔️ Blocking navigation to disallowed URL: {event.url}') self.event_bus.dispatch( BrowserErrorEvent( error_type='NavigationBlocked', message=f'Navigation blocked to disallowed URL: {event.url}', details={'url': event.url, 'reason': 'not_in_allowed_domains'}, ) ) # Stop event propagation by raising exception raise ValueError(f'Navigation to {event.url} blocked by security policy') async def on_NavigationCompleteEvent(self, event: NavigationCompleteEvent) -> None: """Check if navigated URL is allowed and close tab if not.""" # Check if the navigated URL is allowed (in case of redirects) if not self._is_url_allowed(event.url): self.logger.warning(f'⛔️ Navigation to non-allowed URL detected: {event.url}') # Dispatch browser error self.event_bus.dispatch( BrowserErrorEvent( error_type='NavigationBlocked', message=f'Navigation to non-allowed URL: {event.url}', details={'url': event.url, 'target_id': event.target_id}, ) ) # Close the target that navigated to the disallowed URL try: await self.browser_session._cdp_close_page(event.target_id) self.logger.info(f'⛔️ Closed target with non-allowed URL: {event.url}') except Exception as e: self.logger.error(f'⛔️ Failed to close target with non-allowed URL: {type(e).__name__} {e}') async def on_TabCreatedEvent(self, event: TabCreatedEvent) -> None: """Check if new tab URL is allowed.""" if not self._is_url_allowed(event.url): self.logger.warning(f'⛔️ New tab created with disallowed URL: {event.url}') # Dispatch error and try to close the tab self.event_bus.dispatch( BrowserErrorEvent( error_type='TabCreationBlocked', message=f'Tab created with non-allowed URL: {event.url}', details={'url': event.url, 'target_id': event.target_id}, ) ) # Try to close the offending tab try: await self.browser_session._cdp_close_page(event.target_id) self.logger.info(f'⛔️ Closed new tab with non-allowed URL: {event.url}') except Exception as e: self.logger.error(f'⛔️ Failed to close new tab with non-allowed URL: {type(e).__name__} {e}') def _is_root_domain(self, domain: str) -> bool: """Check if a domain is a root domain (no subdomain present). Simple heuristic: only add www for domains with exactly 1 dot (domain.tld). For complex cases like country TLDs or subdomains, users should configure explicitly. Args: domain: The domain to check Returns: True if it's a simple root domain, False otherwise """ # Skip if it contains wildcards or protocol if '*' in domain or '://' in domain: return False return domain.count('.') == 1 def _log_glob_warning(self) -> None: """Log a warning about glob patterns in allowed_domains.""" global _GLOB_WARNING_SHOWN if not _GLOB_WARNING_SHOWN: _GLOB_WARNING_SHOWN = True self.logger.warning( '⚠️ Using glob patterns in allowed_domains. ' 'Note: Patterns like "*.example.com" will match both subdomains AND the main domain.' ) def _is_url_allowed(self, url: str) -> bool: """Check if a URL is allowed based on the allowed_domains configuration. Args: url: The URL to check Returns: True if the URL is allowed, False otherwise """ # If no allowed_domains specified, allow all URLs if ( not self.browser_session.browser_profile.allowed_domains and not self.browser_session.browser_profile.prohibited_domains ): return True # Always allow internal browser targets if url in ['about:blank', 'chrome://new-tab-page/', 'chrome://new-tab-page', 'chrome://newtab/']: return True # Parse the URL to extract components from urllib.parse import urlparse try: parsed = urlparse(url) except Exception: # Invalid URL return False # Get the actual host (domain) host = parsed.hostname if not host: return False # Check each allowed domain pattern if self.browser_session.browser_profile.allowed_domains: for pattern in self.browser_session.browser_profile.allowed_domains: if self._is_url_match(url, host, parsed.scheme, pattern): return True return False # Check each prohibited domain pattern if self.browser_session.browser_profile.prohibited_domains: for pattern in self.browser_session.browser_profile.prohibited_domains: if self._is_url_match(url, host, parsed.scheme, pattern): return False return True return True def _is_url_match(self, url: str, host: str, scheme: str, pattern: str) -> bool: """Check if a URL matches a pattern.""" # Full URL for matching (scheme + host) full_url_pattern = f'{scheme}://{host}' # Handle glob patterns if '*' in pattern: self._log_glob_warning() import fnmatch # Check if pattern matches the host if pattern.startswith('*.'): # Pattern like *.example.com should match subdomains and main domain domain_part = pattern[2:] # Remove *. if host == domain_part or host.endswith('.' + domain_part): # Only match http/https URLs for domain-only patterns if scheme in ['http', 'https']: return True elif pattern.endswith('/*'): # Pattern like brave://* should match any brave:// URL prefix = pattern[:-1] # Remove the * at the end if url.startswith(prefix): return True else: # Use fnmatch for other glob patterns if fnmatch.fnmatch( full_url_pattern if '://' in pattern else host, pattern, ): return True else: # Exact match if '://' in pattern: # Full URL pattern if url.startswith(pattern): return True else: # Domain-only pattern (case-insensitive comparison) if host.lower() == pattern.lower(): return True # If pattern is a root domain, also check www subdomain if self._is_root_domain(pattern) and host.lower() == f'www.{pattern.lower()}': return True return False